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Programmed Diplomacy: 
The Settlement of the North Atlantic 
Fisheries Question, 1907-12 
When The Hague Tribunal brought down its Award on 7 September 1910, 
almost all contemporary observers agreed that the age-old controversy had 
been laid to rest. Only the eulogies differed, varying with the nationality of 
the authors. Allen B. Aylesworth, Agent for the combined team of Canada, 
Great Britain and Newfoundland immediately cabled his Prime Minister, Sir 
Wilfrid Laurier, that they had won all the points of any consequence and that 
only one small feature of the Award was unsatisfactory. Two days later, the 
American Agent, Chandler P. Anderson, sent much the same cheerful sort 
of message to President William Howard Taft: the Americans had gained a 
substantial victory and only one point at issue, itself of slight importance, 
had gone against them.l The confusion of those early days has been perpetu-
ated. The "truth" of the matter still depends largely upon a man's nationality. 
Most Canadian historians who have lately glanced at the Award regard it as 
one which "favoured Canada", "broadly upheld the Canadian case" or 
"generally upheld the case of Canada and Newfoundland."2 When American 
historians scrutinize the Award — and not too many do — they come to very 
different conclusions. S. F. Bemis, after patriotically approaching the subject, 
reached a remarkable half-truth: the "award . . . put into effect the provisions 
of the unratified Bayard-Chamberlain treaty of 1888 for the definition of 
territorial bays . . . ."3 Julius W. Pratt, following the same nationalist course, 
concluded that the Tribunal "decided all the principal questions in favor of 
the United States."4 Thomas A. Bailey, whose historical understanding 
was more precise, likened the decision to a "compromise" in which Glouces-
termen were protected against unreasonable local regulations while New-
foundlanders were "generally sustained in their claims to local jurisdiction."5 
1 Laurier Papers, vol. 642, Public Archives of Canada [hereafter PAC] and Taft Papers, 
vol. 339, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress [hereafter MD/LCJ . 
2 J. M. S. Careless, Canada: A Story of Challenge (2nd. ed., Toronto, 1963), p. 321,- E. Mclnnis, 
Canada: A Political and Social History (Rev. ed., New York, 1960), p. 3%; and Robert 
Craig Brown and Ramsay Cook, Canada 1896 - 1921: A Nation Transformed (Toronto, 
1974), p. 174. 
3 A Diplomatic History of the United States (Rev. ed., New York, 1942), p. 429. Bemis's 
history of the fisheries is filled with sound, fury and errors. 
4 A History of the United States Foreign Policy (New York, 1955), p. 458. 
5 A Diplomatic History of the American People (8th ed., New York, 1969), p. 537. 
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In fact, no historian, whether Canadian or American, has fully understood 
the nature and meaning of the Award. Despite appearances, it was not a com-
promise — unless one were unduly to stretch the meaning of that word and 
simplistically conclude that the British won in principle while the Americans 
won in practice. The Award was the product of programmed diplomacy by 
which the British appeared to win many but by no means all the principles 
contested, while the Americans were assured of the right to practice their 
fishing liberties. That right, however, rested upon a cryptically written Award, 
assurances from the arbitrators, and secret diplomacy; and not until 1912, 
when a second treaty had been struck, was the right confirmed and the de-
cision wrought at The Hague fully implemented. 
When the fisheries question rudely emerged from seventeen years of sus-
pension in 1905, the two principal antagonists were the City of Gloucester, 
Massachusetts and the Colony of Newfoundland. At that time, Gloucester 
dominated America's interest in the North Atlantic fisheries. Though its 
population (in 1898) could not have exceeded 26,000, its fishing fleet of more 
than 350 vessels brought to port a catch worth more than $2,500,000, nearly 
60% of the dollar-value wrested from the ocean by the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts and almost all of the State of Maine's.6 More significantly, in 
the dangerous deep-sea fisheries conducted in the high Atlantic, Gloucester's 
dominance was well nigh absolute. Very few schooners from other New 
England ports visited these waters and as a result Gloucester enjoyed a well 
protected American monopoly of the sale of salt cod and winter herring. Of 
the external forces giving shape to Gloucester's fishing economy, none was 
stronger than the Modus Vivendi of 1888. According to its provisions, which 
had originally been designed as a temporary settlement but had subsequently 
been transformed into Canadian and Newfoundland statutes, an American 
master could acquire commercial privileges in, for example, the Bay of Bulls 
by buying a Newfoundland license. For a slight fee, he could then purchase 
bait-fish and other supplies as well as hire whatever men were required to 
work his dories and tend his trawl-lines. Without the Modus, the same master 
would have to fall back upon the Anglo-American Convention of 1818, which 
had given Americans the "liberty" to fish territorial waters along the Labrador 
shore, the Magdalen Islands, and the southwestern and western coasts of 
Newfoundland. Within these defined areas, he could catch his own bait-fish; 
and, if he wished, he could land and dry his catch on the unoccupied shore-
lines of southwestern Newfoundland and Labrador, although this latter 
"liberty", since Gloucestermen salted their cod, was of no real value. But he 
6 See letter from the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury to Chandler P. Anderson, 2 May 1911, 
Department of State Records, Decimal Files, 1910-29, File No. 711,438, National Archives 
[hereafter NAJ . See also the Report of the United States Commissioner of Fish and Fisheries 
for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1900 (Washington, 1901), pp. 345 et seq. 
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was excluded from all other inshore waters, except for humanitarian missions 
in search of shelter, wood, water or repairs. Given this choice, it was mani-
festly more sensible for an American to take advantage of the Modus rather 
than to use the Convention. Customarily, therefore, Gloucester's deep-sea 
fishing schooners left home with navigating crews of six to eight men and 
sailed directly to the Maritimes or to Newfoundland, where they picked up 
licenses, bought bait-fish, hired fishing crews, and spent the season working 
the cod fisheries on the Grand Banks. 
In this scheme of things, Newfoundland played a critical role. Canadian 
ports such as Sydney continued to serve as depots for fishing crews but rarely 
as sources of bait-fish, and probably not more than one American vessel 
stopped off at Magdalens for bait in any given year. Occasionally Gloucester-
men would slip into the French island-ports of St. Pierre and Miquelon for 
supplies but never in large numbers. The majority of them secured bait-fish 
from agents in the outports of southern Newfoundland and bought their win-
ter herring in the Bay of Islands on the colony's west coast. By 1905, Glouces-
ter depended upon both Canada and Newfoundland for fishing crews and 
general supplies but exclusively upon Newfoundland for bait-fish and winter 
herring. Of the commercial advantages offered by the Modus; none was more 
highly esteemed by Gloucestermen than the winter herring fishery. From the 
moment the fish struck into the arms of the bay in October until the ice 
shielded them in January, fishing vessels from both Gloucester and Lunen-
burg dropped anchor in the Bay of Islands, not far from today's Corner Brook. 
Between fifty and seventy American schooners came annually and perhaps 
as many Canadians, though their numbers frequently ran less than that and 
many were often chartered by the Americans.7 They all came as traders, not 
fishermen; the fishing itself was left to local Newfoundlanders who set out 
gill-nets and retrieved their catch in small craft. Until cold weather set in, the 
herring were either salted down or pickled; but once winter had arrived, the 
much cheaper process of freezing the fish upon scaffolding erected on the 
shore was employed. Whatever their preparation, these herring were intended 
largely for human consumption and were sold at a minimum statutory price 
per barrel. 
The Bay of Islands fishery benefited both parties. The Newfoundlanders 
caught and sold fish more cheaply than their customers could conceivably 
have done by themselves. If an American master ever considered using gill-
nets, he would not only have to bring the gear with him but also an estimated 
7 See various Reports of the Fisheries Protection Service, attached as appendices to New-
foundland, Journals of the House of Assembly [hereafter JHAi. 
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fifty men to work it.8 That was obviously impossible, if only for the reason 
that schooners could not carry more than thirty crewmen. Perhaps the same 
skipper might defy colonial fishing regulations, bring purse-seining equip-
ment (costing approximately $2,500), hire the twenty men needed to handle 
it, and net his own herring. This option was also flawed. Even if Newfound-
land's law against purse seines could be shown to be an unreasonable infringe-
ment of the "liberty" given Americans by the Convention to fish within the 
Bay of Islands, that same Convention forbade them from using the shoreline 
for freezing fish. Under these circumstances, Gloucestermen happily accep-
ted the facts of economic life. In 1904, sixty-seven American schooners 
(almost entirely from Gloucester) bought 85% of the total catch in the Bay 
of Islands.9 The rest was acquired by eleven Canadian vessels and none 
whatever by any Newfoundlanders. Given the bountiful nature of this enter-
prise, Canadians and Americans left the fishery in the hands of the residents 
— and the "locals" thrived. 
Within the United States, the Gloucestermen had a powerful, intricately 
inter-related organization to watch over their interests. Statistics per se 
argued against both unity and strength; there were scarcely more than two 
thousand fishermen in 1910, of whom not more than 15% were American-born 
and well over 60% from Canada and Newfoundland.10 Yet theirs was a co-
herence fashioned by profit-sharing. All the schooners were worked "on 
shares" and the captains belonged to a tightly-knit, guild-like body called the 
Master Mariners' Association. On the same street where the Masters had 
their lodge were located the offices of the Gloucester Daily Times and the 
Gloucester Board of Trade. Membership among all these organizations was 
closely interwoven. The fifty or sixty merchants who owned the schooners 
and sold the fish were invariably members of the Board and often "Associ-
ates" within the Mariners' fraternity. One of them, William D. Jordan, adver-
tised himself and his company within the Gloucester Directory as "Wholesale 
Salt Fish Dealers"; unadvertised, though revealed in the same Directory, 
were the facts that Jordan was also Collector of Customs and a principal 
8 Information regarding projected costs (in men and equipment) was drawn from the following 
sources: A. B. Alexander of the Fisheries Bureau to the Secretary of State, 1 February 1910; 
Arthur L. Millett of the Gloucester Board of Trade to the Secretary of State, 31 January 
1910; Numerical Files, 1910-29, File No. 17931, NA; and A. P. Gardner to Chandler P. 
Anderson, 28 June 1906, Chandler P. Anderson Papers, MD/LC. 
9 Report of the Fisheries Protection Service for the Year 1905, Newfoundland, JHA, 1905. 
10 See letter from the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury to Anderson, 2 May 1911, op. cit. 
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officer in the Gloucester National Bank.11 Behind men like Jordan stood 
(after 1902) their congressman, A. P. "Gussie" Gardner; behind him stood his 
father-in-law, United States Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, close friend of 
President Roosevelt and the strongest member of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee. 
All of Gloucester's organizational strength was called into action when Sir 
Robert Bond's government of Newfoundland announced a bold double-
barreled policy for the fisheries in the spring of 1905. Bond introduced into 
the legislature a Foreign Fishing Vessels Act (FFVA) which sailed through 
his parliament and was proclaimed on 15 June.12 It was a retaliatory piece 
of legislation intended to force the United States into ratifying the reci-
procal Hay-Bond Treaty, which Bond had negotiated in 1902 but now lay 
entombed in the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee. Americans were 
stripped of all commercial privileges extended by the Modus. The law author-
ized colonial officials to board, search and bring into port any vessel found 
within territorial waters and suspected of buying bait-fish, engaging local 
crewmen, purchasing supplies or entering the colony's domain for any pur-
poses other than those allowed under the Convention. The presence aboard 
such a vessel of bait-fish, Newfoundland servants, and the like would be 
"prima facie" evidence of their having been illegally acquired. Guilty parties 
were subject to fines; and their ships, together with stores and rigging, to 
forfeiture. Although the Act specified that none of its provisions affected 
any rights granted Americans by the Convention, Bond also enunciated a 
new interpretation (his own) of that agreement which would have so re-
stricted those rights as to make them inoperable.13 During the debates in the 
assembly in the spring of 1905, the premier drew attention to an apparent 
discrepancy in the wording of the Convention. On the one hand, it authorized 
Americans to fish in the "Bays, Harbours and Creeks" along certain stretches 
of Labrador; but, on the other, it stated that they could fish only on the 
"Coast" of Newfoundland. Such a linguistic difference demonstrated to Bond, 
despite a broad belief to the contrary which had prevailed for almost ninety 
years, that Americans could not fish within the territorial waters of his 
11 Gloucester Directory, 1911, p. 618, Cape Ann Historical Association, Gloucester, Massa-
chusetts. See also directories for the years 1903, 1905 and 1907, as well as various publica-
tions by the Master Mariners' Association, ibid. Arthur L. Milieu, for example, worked for 
the Daily Times, the Gloucester Board of Trade, the Master Mariner's Association (writing 
for its annual publications), and went to The Hague in 1910 as an "attaché" of the State 
Department. 
12 Newfoundland, JHA, 1905, pp. 6-9. See also the Supplement to the American Journal of 
International Law, I (1907), pp. 22-24. 
13 Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 1 August 1905, FO 5/2622, Public Record Office [here-
after P R O ! . 
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colony — only beyond; and according to Bond's view of such things, three 
miles beyond the headlands. 
The consequences of Bond's policies were soon revealed. Gloucestermen, 
whose habits had been shaped by seventeen years under the Modus, found 
it difficult to adjust to new conditions. Many were unsure of their rights un-
der the Convention, and amidst their confusion they were confronted by un-
friendly Newfoundland authorities who enforced the Convention literally and 
applied colonial ordinances with rigor. During the season of 1905, at least 
two American vessels seeking refuge for repairs along the non-treaty coast 
were harrassed, while eighteen were prosecuted for failing to report to cus-
toms.14 Nonetheless, the withdrawal of commercial privileges proved more 
annoying than detrimental. Gloucester's "bankers" found it possible to get 
bait-fish elsewhere, buying it from Canadians on Cape Breton or from the 
French at St. Pierre (both of whom probably acquired the greater part of 
their stock from Newfoundland) or by fishing for themselves within the dis-
puted headlands on the southern coast.15 The Americans grudgingly accepted 
Newfoundland's aggressive stand on the non-treaty coast, knowing that the 
colony had a right to abrogate the Modus and that they could still carry on 
their deep-sea fisheries. It was quite a different matter on the West Coast, 
where the threatened application of local fishing regulations and the imple-
mentation of Bond's doctrine could destroy Gloucester's interests in the 
winter herring fishery. 
From the beginning, the "eye" of the diplomatic storm was centered in the 
Bay of Islands — a fact that was recognized at once by both the United 
States and Great Britain. Before assuming office in September, 1905, Amer-
ica's incoming Secretary of State, Elihu Root, travelled leisurely along the 
West Coast, mingling the sport of salmon fishing with the business of getting 
to understand the commercial fisheries.16 Before his departure, he took the 
precaution of ordering a fishery commission vessel, the "Grampus", to visit 
the area and remain until the season ended. For public knowledge, the 
"Grampus" was sent to observe "the movements of mackerel" and to conduct 
other scientific labors.17 The real reason was to place Professor Alvin B. 
Alexander, Chief of the Division of Fisheries, in a position to advise Glouces-
14 U.S. Consul at St. Pierre to State Department, 16 and 20 September 1905, Consular Papers, 
Records of the State Department, NA. 
15 Lodge to Roosevelt, 12 May 1905, contained in H. C. Lodge, ed., Selections from the 
Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1884-1918 (New York, 
1925), II, pp. 119-120. 
16 Phillip C. Jessup, Elihu Root (New York, 1938), II, p. 84. John Hay, Root's predecessor, 
died on 1 July 1905. 
17 Note from the Acting Secretary of State to Sir Mortimer Durand, enclosed in Durand to 
Lansdowne, 27 July 1905, FO 5/2622, PRO. Durand was the British Ambassador to the 
United States,- the Marquess of Lansdowne was Britain's Foreign Secretary. 
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termen about their Convention rights and to acquaint the State Department 
with local developments. 
To prevent collisions between Newfoundlanders and Gloucestermen, 
Britain sent a small warship to the Bay of Islands. Throughout the season, 
London worried more about what Bond might do than about the Americans. 
Repeatedly the premier was told that there was "no foundation for [his] 
view . . . that [ the] terms of the Convention of 1818 prohibit United States 
citizens from fishing in bays, harbours, and creeks between Cape Ray and 
Rameau Islands and between Cape Ray and Quipon Islands and [ that] His 
Majesty's Government cannot countenance any action based on that view."18 
He was also informed that, in the opinion of Britain's law officers, Americans 
could fish in these waters while Newfoundland could restrict the fishery 
according to the FF VA; but it was made very clear that HMG would "strongly 
deprecate" any attempts to enforce the act. Bond was told not to apprehend 
any Americans and warned that Britain would not be "responsible for any 
consequences in the way of retaliation by the United States . . . ."19 
Nonetheless, beginning with tales that the "S.S. Fionna", a Newfoundland 
cruiser managed by Joseph O'Reilly of the Fisheries Protection Service, was 
keeping Americans from fishing and ending with stories about net-cutting by 
Newfoundlanders, wild rumors from the Bay kept the Colonial Office and 
the State Department in a dither throughout most of the season. Although 
none of the reports was true, the first false rumor from the Bay of Islands 
triggered the diplomatic exchange between Washington and London which 
led ultimately to arbitration at The Hague. Believing the rumor about the 
"Fionna", Root immediately protested (19 October 1905) to the British Am-
bassador and urged Britain to repeal the entire FF VA.20 After a long delay 
occasioned by Britain's change of government, Root got an answer from 
London. It came from the new Foreign Office Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, 
and was handed to the American Ambassador, Whitelaw Reid, on 2 February 
1906.21 Grey argued that the FF VA was not meant to restrict American fish-
ing rights, nor did it do so. However, all Grey's arguments were shattered 
when Bond passed a second act in May, 1906.22 This statute restated the pro-
visions of the old act and added new provisions to plug loopholes which had 
18 Colonial Secretary, Sir Alfred Lyttleton, to the Administrator of Newfoundland, 17 August 
1905, enclosed in CO to FO, 23 August 1905, FO 5/2622, PRO. 
19 Lyttleton to Sir William MacGregor, Governor of Newfoundland, 25 October 1905, FO 
5/2622, PRO. 
20 Enclosed in Durand to Lansdowne, 19 October 1905, FO 5/2623, PRO. 
21 Contained in the Supplement to the American Journal of International Law, op. cit., pp. 
355-64. 
22 Ibid., pp. 24-7. 
50 Acadiensis 
appeared during the season of 1905. In the future, no Newfoundlander could 
fish in home waters from an American vessel; no resident could leave the 
island to take employment on an American vessel intending to fish within 
colonial limits; no Newfoundland fishing gear or supplies could be sold to 
Americans; and the master of any American or colonial craft conveying resi-
dents beyond territorial limits to engage aboard an American ship would be 
liable to severe penalties. Finally the law stated that American ships exer-
cising Convention rights would be "amenable to all laws of the Colony not 
inconsistent with such rights under treaty or convention", i.e., laws regarding 
Sunday fishing, lighthouse dues, and so forth. 
With Bond's new legislation in mind, Washington resorted to a cruder 
style of diplomacy. The President, whose concern over the fisheries was that 
of his good friend Cabot Lodge, told Whitelaw Reid that the British were 
now — as they once had in the Alaska boundary question — "drifting where 
we shall have to send a warship up to Newfoundland to look after our own 
interests."23 Naturally Reid conveyed the gist of this warning to the Foreign 
Office; and a few days later, he followed it up with Root's formal response 
to Grey's February memorandum, in which the Secretary of State put his 
case in inflexible terms.24 Grey got the message. It was now very clear that 
the opposing positions regarding the fisheries had become so polarized that 
a quick settlement was impossible. He and his government therefore decided 
upon a modus vivendi for the coming season — breathing space in which to 
work out a diplomatic solution. On 8 August, the Colonial Office acquainted 
St. John's with this decision and sought suggestions concerning the nature 
of the modus, inquiring whether Newfoundland would prefer to allow Sunday 
fishing or the use of purse seines. About a week later, the Foreign Office 
informed Reid that it would, because of the wide divergence of Anglo-
American views, be submitting proposals for a modus. 
Bond's response was unrealistic.25 Rather than a modus, which would un-
dermine his present policies, he favoured another form of action. In effect, 
he was willing to let Americans fish without restrictions, provided no New-
foundlanders worked for them. Grey's initial proposal was the exact opposite 
of Bond's. Britain offered not to enforce the new FFVA and to remove those 
sections of the old act to which Root objected. In return, it asked the United 
States to comply with all of Newfoundland's other laws and fishing regulations, 
23 Roosevelt to Reid, 27 June 1906, vol. 153, Roosevelt Papers, MD/LC. 
24 Root to Reid, 30 June 1906, enclosed in Reid to Sir Edward Grey, 20 July 1906, Supplement 
to the American Journal of International Law, op. cit., pp. 364-373. See also Reid to Roose-
velt, 17 July 1906, Reid Papers, vol. 167, MD/LC. 
25 MacGregor to Elgin, 22 August and 8 September 1906, Correspondence regarding U.S. 
Fishing Question, 1905-09, Provincial Archives of Newfoundland. 
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i.e., pay light dues and so forth. Practically speaking, the agreement would 
make American fishermen completely dependent upon cooperation with any 
Newfoundlanders who dared to defy Bond and engage themselves beyond the 
three-mile limit. Reid's answer came only after the State Department had 
carefully checked with the power-structure of Gloucester. With one impor-
tant exception and a few qualifications, the United States accepted Britain's 
proposal. Though Sunday fishing was renounced, the use of purse seines was 
insisted upon, for if Newfoundlanders either could not or would not work for 
Americans there might be no winter herring fishery at all. The Americans 
would pay lighthouse dues, provided their fishing rights were unobstructed 
— and enter customs, if that were physically possible. To avoid embarrasing 
Bond, they also promised to engage Newfoundlanders far enough outside 
the three-mile limit to remove all reasonable doubts as to the location. The 
modus itself took effect by an exchange of notes on 6 and 8 October 1906 
between the Foreign Office and the American Embassy. 
In reaching this accord, His Majesty's Government knowingly rode 
"roughshod" over its senior colony, oblivious to the cries of outrage inevitably 
to arise in Britain and Canada as well as in St. John's.26 By fiat, Britain 
assumed authority over the fisheries. Many reasons suggest themselves to 
explain this manifestation of raw imperial power. Primary among them was 
Sir Edward Grey's (and his government's) .passionate desire for an Anglo-
American "bond of union" on such trans-Atlantic issues as the fisheries.27 
Underlying this sentiment was an unpleasant truth: Britain did not wish to 
quarrel with the United States over a matter in which its president had shown 
so strong a personal interest. Significant, too, was the fact that no one in 
authority, either in the Colonial or the Foreign Office, seemed to sympathize 
with either Bond or his Newfoundlanders. They disliked and distrusted the 
premier, regarding him as a "very dangerous man" and his fellow islanders as 
"deceitful and despicably wicked".28 Quite obviously, Gloucester exercised 
a great and continuous influence upon Washington that was unseen in St. 
John's' relations with London. 
With the modus vivendi in hand, the diplomats could begin searching for a 
lasting solution to the fisheries. Both Washington and London initially re-
jected arbitration and looked for a political formula instead. Britain opti-
26 Minute by F. A. Larcom on CO to FO, 28 September 1906, FO 371/160, PRO. 
27 Grey to Durand, 2 January 1905 [l906], Grey Papers, FO 800/80, PRO. 
28 Sir M. F. Ommanney, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, to Lord Elgin, 
6 June 1906, Elgin Papers, Microfilm No. 2, Queen's University, Kingston; Lansdowne to 
Durand, 14 November 1905, Durand Papers, Item 14A, University of London. The Earl of 
Elgin was Colonial Secretary. For another view, see Peter F. Neary and Sidney J. R. Noel, 
"Newfoundland's Quest for Reciprocity, 1890-1910", in Mason Wade, ed., Regionalism in 
the Canadian Community (Toronto, 1969), passim. 
52 Acadiensis 
mistically pinned its hopes on James Bryce, the new ambassador who came 
to Washington in March, 1907, to replace Durand. But Bryce soon discovered 
that Gloucester's interests were kept safe in Root's hands. That city's views, 
which were continually being sought by the State Department, were clearly 
expressed.29 What the fishermen wanted was a return to the good old days 
in the Bay of Islands and elsewhere and, to regain the past, they were willing 
to part with any fishing practices to which Newfoundland might object. But 
never would they pay the price of reciprocity, for the conviction persisted 
among them that such a policy would ruin their economy. As long as Root 
was Secretary of State, the Hay-Bond Treaty would never be revived. More-
over, within the Department, the "tendency . . . [was] strongly against" 
arbitration, believing that there was nothing to arbitrate with Canada and 
that American rights might be compromised if arbitration were arranged with 
Newfoundland.30 All that Root would suggest to Bryce, when they first con-
versed about slate-cleaning differences in mid-March, 1907, was that Britain 
and the United States ought to establish a joint commission to frame fishing 
regulations.31 
In Canadian-American relations, the fisheries did not possess the contro-
versial qualities evident in Newfoundland-American relations. Yet what 
seemed at first to be merely another item on the slate-cleaning agenda which 
Root proposed to Canada in May 1906 quickly grew to vexing proportions, 
as Newfoundland's quarrel with the United States worsened. When Sir Robert 
ended the Modus of 1888, he drove an increasing number of Americans into 
Canadian ports for their bait-fish and other supplies and services; and on 24 
May 1907, a Gloucester schooner, the "Alert", came to the Magdalens and 
tried, unlicensed, to fish for bait within inshore waters in a manner and with 
equipment forbidden by Canadian law.32 The incident was quickly and 
amicably resolved but its meaning lingered: Laurier had not wanted to get 
involved in arbitration, but Canada, regardless of Laurier's personal feelings, 
29 A. B. Alexander to the State Department, 26 January and 5 April 1907, Numerical Files, 
1906-10, File No. 573, NA. 
30 Whitelaw Reid to John R. Carter, First Secretary, United States Embassy, London, 7 January 
1907, Reid Papers, vol. 168, MD/LC. 
31 James Bryce to Sir Edward Grey, 19 March 1907, FO 371/360, PRO. 
32 There is a good deal of material on the "Alert" case in the Numerical Files 1906-10, File 
No. 573. See also Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1907 (Wash-
ington 1910), pp. 533-7. Of intriguing interest is the fact that the captain of the "Alert", 
A. D. Malloch, had been engaged in a similar escapade in 1906. At that time, he was master 
of the "Edna Wallace Hooper" out of Gloucester; and he attempted to build scaffolding 
on the shores of the Bay of Islands in order to freeze herring. The Government of Newfound-
land confiscated (from Malloch) a seine and several dories but A. B. Alexander told him 
(and others with claims) that their losses would be met. See Numerical Files, 1906-10, File 
No. 293. 
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would now be inextricably involved in any future arbitration proceedings. 
By August, Sir Wilfrid had to tell London that, although the principle of 
arbitration was still distasteful, he would agree to it.33 In his opinion, Bond's 
foolish policies had brought Britain to the point where it was the only solution. 
By this time, the United States had reversed its stand and proposed to 
Great Britain that their differences be arbitrated at The Hague. It was not an 
easy decision for any of the parties to the controversy to reach. Only after 
months of strenuous claims and counter-claims were Britain and the United 
States convinced that their positions were too divergent for diplomacy. In-
creasingly borne upon Bond was the unpleasant fact that his retaliatory 
policies had failed and, indeed, now threatened his own political fortunes. 
At London's Imperial Conference in June 1907, he covertly agreed with the 
Foreign Office that, if his policies were not productive, he would take his 
case to The Hague.34 As soon as he was committed to this course, Canada had 
no choice but to follow him. A month later, Britain neatly maneuvered the 
United States into making the first approach to arbitration, thereby sealing 
Bond's bargain with the home government and assuring Laurier's compliance. 
Despite a general agreement to arbitrate, not until late January, 1909, were 
all parties able to concur upon procedure and practice. For this gradual 
march of events, there were two fundamental causes. The British side was 
long unable to fashion common terms of reference; and once they had done 
so in the spring of 1908, it still remained for the diplomats to reconcile the 
American and the British terms. 
Britain's pace was a consequence of her decision to leave matters in colon-
ial hands. There would be no more riding roughshod over Newfoundland. 
Arbitration would be a colonial enterprise and, if Newfoundland held back 
or faltered, Whitehall counted on Canada to pick up the cadence. What 
seemed like a sensible imperial policy became an ordeal for the Colonial 
Office. For months, Bond annoyed everyone by insisting he would "paddle 
his own canoe unassisted by Canada", while revealing none of his own plans 
(if he had any) and scorning all offers of help.35 So long as Bond remained 
aloof, Sir Wilfrid Laurier did little to disturb him. From first to last, Laurier 
resolutely refused to say or do anything that would "give offense to" the 
Newfoundlander, graciously offering aid but always leaving him the initia-
tive.36 Bond was not being coquettish or uncooperative. Association with 
Canada would greatly strengthen his position at The Hague, shoring up his 
33 Lord Grey to Lord Elgin, 13 August 1907, vol. 754, Laurier Papers, PAC. Cf. Grey to Bryce, 
vol. 7, Grey of Howick Papers, PAC. 
34 Sir Edward Grey to James Bryce, 14 May 1907, Grey Papers, FO 800/80, PRO. 
35 Elgin to Sir Edward Grey, 21 November 1907, ibid. 
36 Lord Grey to Bryce, 22 November 1907, vol. 7, Grey of Howick Papers, PAC. 
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little corps of lawyers with expertise and experience; and if he did not accept 
Canada's aid, he would have to turn to London. Yet, at the same time, co-
operation with Canada would expose him to attacks from numerous indepen-
dent-minded countrymen in the House of Assembly. Inevitably they would 
identify cooperation with confederation — and no suspected confederationist 
could expect to survive in Newfoundland politics. 
Bond made his break in January, 1908, announcing in the Throne Speech 
on the 9th that, at the Imperial Conference, he had "suggested that all 
questions arising under the . . . Treaty [ of 1818] be referred to the Hague 
for arbitrament, and the three other Governments interested in the question 
. . . have concurred . . . ."37 Just before that splendid revelation, he cabled 
Laurier an outline of the roughest sort of draft terms of reference and asked 
what questions Ottawa would be submitting. To this overture, Sir Wilfrid 
replied that he only wished "to assist you and to join with you in the case 
which you intend to propose."38 Although Bond's questions seemed accept-
able, he would resist commenting upon them until he and his legal advisors 
had received the full text from St. John's. With the reception of that docu-
ment in late January, cooperation began. Throughout four months of ex-
tended correspondence — there were no conferences despite Ottawa's 
urgings — Laurier's government stuck to its policy of non-interference but 
still managed to obtain extraordinary results. Allen B. Aylesworth, Laurier's 
Minister of Justice, imparted to Bond's question a greater clarity and effec-
tiveness. He got the Newfoundlander to admit that Britain had never exercised 
an unmeasured control over the fisheries, only the authority to legislate 
"reasonable provisions for the regulation of fishing operations."39 Out of 
friendship, he embraced Bond's dubious interpretation about the Convention 
and inserted the Magdalen Islands within it. Most significantly of all, Ayles-
worth pointed out to Bond that, according to The Hague Convention under 
which arbitration would proceed, the judges would be drawn from the Per-
manent Court, a body in which neither Newfoundland nor Canada had a 
member while the United States and Britain had four each. He asked whether 
the composition of an arbitral tribunal might be more important than the 
questions submitted to it. The upshot was Britain's selection of Canada's 
Chief Justice, Sir Charles Fitzpatrick, to fill a chance British vacancy on 
the court. 
For some reason, Aylesworth never disclosed to Newfoundland his fears 
that the American questions might be so structured as to authorize the arbi-
37 Newfoundland, JHA, 1908, pp. 3-4. 
38 Laurier to Bond, 17 January 1908, vol. 500, Laurier Papers, PAC. 
39 Memorandum of Suggested Questions, enclosed in Aylesworth to the Attorney General 
of Newfoundland, 29 February 1908, Governor-General's Numbered Files, File No. 192F, 
vol. Kb), PAC. 
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trators, "should they decide the question of right against the United States, 
to prescribe regulations to which Canadians were to conform in exercising 
their rights."40 What he had in mind was the Bering Sea Tribunal of 1893, 
where Canada's rights to pelagic sealing had been upheld, only to be severely 
restricted by regulations laid down later by the same court. His suspicions 
were well founded; the mystery is why he never acted upon them. Despite his 
own forewarnings, he failed to comprehend the programmed diplomacy that 
was taking place; and not till the final award did he try to wriggle out of the 
results. One wonders whether his deafness, which came suddenly upon him 
in the summer of 1907, was symptomatic of a generally deteriorating state of 
health. 
The United States began composing its questions early in January, 1909. 
The man responsible for the drafting was Chandler P. Anderson, a clever 
Wall Street lawyer and special agent for the State Department in Canadian-
American affairs. He wrote draft after draft, submitting them all to Secretary 
of State Elihu Root, and most of them to the other lawyers who would be 
arguing the American case. Throughout Anderson's labors, Root's directions 
were clear and unmistakable: put the questions in such a form that the arbi-
trators have to answer them in America's favor.41 
On 8 May 1908, Root presented the British Ambassador, James Bryce, with 
a draft of the "Special Agreement for the submission of questions relating 
to the Northeastern Fisheries under the General Treaty of Arbitration con-
cluded between the United States and Great Britain on the 4th day of 
April."42 Although a simple diplomatic instrument could have served, there 
were good reasons for selecting this particular one. Bryce had always been 
a fervent believer in the arbitral process. When Root suggested to him in 
January that a General Arbitration Treaty, once approved by the American 
Senate, would not only guarantee that the fisheries would be referred to 
The Hague but that other controversies could also be arbitrated, the ambassa-
dor agreed at once and quickly secured the acceptance of the treaty by his 
home government. Root's proposal dealt with procedural matters; his draft 
of questions followed within a fortnight, when both sides exchanged proposed 
terms of reference. The American set was markedly different from the 
straight-forward British set.43 The Americans began with questions about 
40 Aylesworth to Laurier, 15 April 1908, vol. 514, Laurier Papers, PAC. 
41 Root to Anderson, 29 April 1908, Chandler P. Anderson Papers, MD/LC. 
42 Enclosed in Bryce to Lord Grey, 12 May 1908, vol. 756, pp. 216177-82, Laurier Papers, 
PAC. 
43 The Canadian/Newfoundland set was enclosed in Aylesworth to the Governor-General 
in Council, 18 April 1908, Governor-General's Numbered Files, File No. 192F, vol. 1(b), 
PAC; the American set was enclosed in Bryce to Sir Edward Grey, 22 May 1908, GR 7, G 6, 
vol. 64 (2), PAC — with the copy sent to Lord Grey. 
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principles, asking whether fishing regulations could be imposed unless they 
were necessary to protect the fisheries, uniformly applied and inherently 
reasonable. Moreover, they questioned whether regulations could exist 
without common agreement upon their appropriateness and unless the United 
States shared in their enforcement. Then came a series of specific questions 
touching all the bones of contention. Following this was an artfully con-
structed question inquiring whether existing colonial acts contravened or 
impaired America's liberties. If so, and if an answer required further examina-
tion, the tribunal was to refer the acts to a special committee of experts who 
were to visit and study the fisheries and whose decision was to become part 
of the final award. Finally, a follow-up question was inserted: "The Tribunal 
shall in such case [per supra] also prescribe rules and a method or procedure 
under which all similar questions with respect to the appropriateness, necess-
ity, reasonableness and fairness hereafter proposed to the fisheries may be 
similarly determined." 
Although Aylesworth's prophecy seemed about to come true, very little 
was done to prevent it. Unsympathetic to Newfoundland and always ready to 
assert the imperial will whenever Bond delayed diplomacy, the British Am-
bassador took a very light view of the American questions. It did not matter 
to him how they were stated; the issues would be correctly decided if the 
arbitrators were "worth their salt."44 He also believed that some way had to 
be found for settling future differences about regulations. "Of course," he 
wrote the Colonial Secretary, "Canada & Newfoundland will kick at the 
notion . . . but something of the sort is needed."45 Officials in Britain were also 
willing to let both sets of questions go before the Tribunal; and in Ottawa, no 
one seemed concerned about the nature of Root's questions. Laurier merely 
objected to the existence of two sets, unpersuaded by Governor-General 
Grey's arguments that their differences were "trifling."46 Once again, how-
ever, Sir Wilfrid was willing to defer to Bond's "better judgement."47 When 
the latter opted for a single set, Bryce manfully tried to combine impossible 
elements. Throughout November and December, drafts shuttled back and 
forth between his embassy and the State Department with the constant com-
plaint being voiced at either end that one party was trying to eliminate the 
other's questions. At last, Bryce arranged a provisional agreement which 
fused all questions except for the one about fishing regulations; and to Lord 
44 Bryce to Lord Grey, 24 May 1908, vol. 8, Grey of Howick Papers, PAC. 
45 Bryce to Lord Crewe, 25 May 1908, Crewe Papers, C3, Cambridge University Library. The 
Marquess of Crewe succeeded Elgin as Colonial Secretary in 1908. 
46 Lord Grey to Crewe, 11 September 1908, vol. 15, Grey of Howick Papers, PAC. 
47 Laurier to Bond, 11 September 1908, vol. 533, Laurier Papers, PAC. 
Acadiensis 57 
Grey, he sighed that it represented the "Maximum . . . we can get in the way 
of an agreed set of questions."48 
The Special Agreement was provisionally signed in Washington on 27 
January 1909. Qualification was necessary because Bond's man lacked full 
powers and both Newfoundland and the American Senate would have to 
approve the agreement before it could come into effect. After several days 
of indecision, Sir Robert accepted on 3 February. The Senate followed suit 
on the 18th, though appending an explanatory note stating that the agree-
went excluded the Gut of Canso and the Bay of Fundy. When the long 
struggle was over, both Bryce and Aylesworth expressed their jubilation. In 
a private letter to London, the ambassador suggested that, if Britain ever 
awarded decorations to Americans, as the French had given the Grand Cross 
of Legion to John Hay, Root should be a candidate — "for his services to the 
cause of arbitration."49 Aylesworth would have preferred that the honors 
be tendered to Bryce, whom he extolled as Canada's "spokesman and 
champion."50 
If Aylesworth had carefully read and comprehended the Special Agree-
ment,51 he probably would have branded Root as a scoundrel and Bryce as a 
dupe. Article I contained all questions, the first and most critical of which 
had two versions. The British contended that the American liberty to fish 
was "subject, without the consent of the United States, to reasonable regu-
lations by Great Britain, Canada, or Newfoundland . . . ." However, such 
regulations had to be "appropriate and necessary" to protect the fishery, 
the right of British subjects, and the liberties of Americans; "desirable on 
grounds of public order and morals," and "equitable and fair as between" 
local fishermen and visiting Americans. On the other hand, the Americans 
contended that their liberty was "not subject to limitations or restraint", 
unless the regulations were appropriate, necessary, reasonable and fair, and 
unless the appropriateness, etc., should be "determined . . . by common ac-
cord and the United States concurs in their enforcement." All the other 
questions, numbered two through seven, then followed, and since the suc-
ceeding articles of the Special Agreement, II through IV, virtually assured 
the Americans of a directed verdict in their favour, it is essential that they 
be understood. Article II stated that either party could call the attention of 
the Tribunal to any acts "claimed to be inconsistent . . . with the Treaty of 
48 Bryce to Lord Grey, 30 December 1908, vol. 8, Grey of Howick Papers, PAC. 
49 Bryce to Sir Charles Hardinge (Permanent Under-Secretary of State for the Foreign Office), 
8 February 1909, Grey Papers, FO 800/80, PRO. 
50 Aylesworth to Governor-General Grey, 8 February 1909, Governor-General's Numbered 
Files, File No. 192F, vol. 2(a), PAC. 
51 For a copy of the agreement, see Foreign Relations, 1909 (Washington, 1914), pp. 275-83. 
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1818." (This would be done by Anderson in June 1909, and again on 13 August 
1910, the day after the trial.) Either party could ask the Tribunal "to express 
in its Award its opinion" about such acts, illustrating (if need be) how they 
contravened the principles of the Award; and "each Party agrees to conform 
to such opinion." Article III stated that, if any question arose about present 
regulations which required expert examination and information, the Tribunal 
could appoint a three-man committee of experts and instruct them to inquire 
into designated regulations. Their report, if accepted by the Tribunal, would 
become part of the Award. Article IV directed the Tribunal to recommend 
rules and procedures for any future controversies. If the parties did not ac-
cept these recommendations and if future differences developed, they had to 
return to The Hague for judgement. The remaining articles of the agreement 
dealt largely with details of the arbitral process. 
Invitations were dispatched to the chosen judges of the Permanent Court 
on 5 March 1909, the day after the agreement's proclamation. In structure 
and in composition, the Hague Tribunal of 1910 was strikingly different from 
the Alaska Boundary Tribunal of 1903. From the outset, all parties had 
agreed that the court should consist of an uneven number of men, all drawn 
from the Permanent Court. Newfoundland originally wanted three judges. 
Each party would select one, the two name a third, and none of them would 
be a national. But Britain found a potential flaw in this formula. With the 
French Shore still rankling Frenchmen, Newfoundland would not want any-
one from that country; and if British, American and French judges were ex-
cluded, there might not be enough English-speaking jurists left. London 
suggested instead that an Austrian, Heinrich Lammasch, be picked by both 
parties as presiding officer and that Britain appoint Canada's Chief Justice, 
hoping by example to induce the United States to do the same. Root, on the 
other hand, wanted a five-man court so that the majority could be non-
national and the award carry maximum weight.52 Though he had no objec-
tions to Sir Charles Fitzpatrick, he believed the American Chief Justice was 
too old to be considered. Bryce also favored the larger court, especially since 
Root felt so strongly on the subject; and the home government concurred, 
easily convincing Newfoundland and Canada of the wisdom of that decision.53 
The resulting court was a felicitous combination of national and non-
national members. Although both sides doubtless scanned the whole list of 
judges, screening out non-nationals whose views might be prejudiced, the 
three ultimately chosen were men with worldwide reputations in the field of 
52 Bryce to Sir Edward Grey, 25 May 1908, Crewe Papers, C3, Cambridge University Library. 
53 Laurier did not care much either way, whether a three-man or a five-man court, and was 
willing — as always — to go along with Newfoundland. See Lord Grey to Bryce, 16 May 
1908, vol. 8, Grey of Howick Papers, PAC. 
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international law. As president, both parties agreed upon Lammasch, who 
was a member of Austro-Hungary's upper chamber and Professor of Inter-
national Law at the University of Vienna. Britain nominated a Hollander, 
A. F. de Savornin Lohman, his country's Minister of State and a renowned 
lawyer. In turn, the United States selected an Argentinian, Luis M. Drago, 
former Minister of Foreign Affairs. The choice of national members was 
equally appropos. The United States appointed George Gray, ex-Senator 
from Delaware and present Judge of the Circuit Court of Appeals, Third 
District. Gray was picked though it was well known that, as a senator, he had 
defended the ill-fated Chamberlain-Bayard Treaty and had expressed the 
strongest sort of sentiment for Canada's claims to exclusive rights over her 
large bays.54 Gray was pro-Canadian in other ways, too, belonging to that 
little colony of American jurists and businessmen who summered at Murray 
Bay, Quebec. Also a summer resident and the close friend of several American 
judges, including Gray, was Sir Charles Fitzpatrick, Britain's choice as its 
national member. "Fitz" had been appointed on 27 May 1908 to fill a vacancy 
on the Permanent Court "with a view to his serving on the Court to which it is 
proposed that the Atlantic Fisheries be referred."55 
Fitzpatrick's selection was an imperial concession. So was the appointment 
of Aylesworth as British Agent, for it was the private wish of the home govern-
ment "to give the Dominion and Colony the onus of preparing, settling, and 
presenting the prime substance of the case."56 As Agent, Aylesworth theor-
etically assumed this supervisory burden as well as the responsibilities of 
general trustee for Canada's and Newfoundland's sovereignty. And in the eyes 
of his compatriots he apparently succeeded, being knighted for these and 
other efforts. Despite that honor, Aylesworth was not an effective Agent. 
His deafness obviously precluded normal intercourse; but this disability per 
se could not have accounted for the fact that he frequently seemed uncom-
prehending of the written as well as the spoken word and too often just did 
not know what was going on. Furthermore, he disliked Fitzpatrick and, during 
the trial, collaboration between them was difficult if not impossible. He 
prided himself as "being almost if not quite as violent a jingo as" Sam 
Hughes;57 and the British, recognizing the force of Aylesworth's imperialism, 
54 Anderson to Root, 12 March 1908, Anderson Papers, MD/LC. 
55 W. Langley of the FO to the Under-Secretary of the CO, 13 June 1908, Fitzpatrick Papers, 
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7057-62. 
60 Acadiensis 
reckoned he would "knock under to any pressure from above . . . ."58 More 
importantly, Aylesworth was delinquent where he should have been active. 
He kept aloof from the detailed preparation of the case, neither consulting 
with his workers nor reading their work until it was in print.59 
The great bulk of the work done in preparing the British case was accomp-
lished by the author of the Kingdom of Canada Papers, John S. Ewart, a 
highly qualified Ottawa lawyer. After exhausting Canadian repositories, he 
moved to London, where he was joined by other men in whose selection 
Aylesworth played the vital role; but it was Ewart who first picked up the 
threads of research in the fall of 1908, who kept at it until the trial began in 
May 1910, and who then served as one of the advocates. For these Herculean 
labors, Ewart paid the price, being driven almost to the edge of a nervous 
breakdown. At The Hague, he lived alone, some distance from his colleagues, 
and would rarely collaborate with them. For all that, Ewart's input was im-
measureable. "None of us who took part in the case," a grateful British 
senior counsel wrote afterwards, "will ever forget or minimize how much we 
owe to your efforts in the supply of material on which we worked."60 
Newfoundland's contribution to the British case was negligible. In consider-
ing the research done, Aylesworth complained that he had not had "one 
single atom of help from Newfoundland — not one atom."61 Having created 
the fisheries problem in the first place, the island colony did little or nothing 
to resolve it. While St. John's drifted, Ottawa conned the ship, engaging the 
counsel and solicitors and putting up all the money, for which Newfoundland 
had not paid a penny of its half-share by the spring of 1911. At the trail itself, 
Sir James Winter, the colony's chief representative, cut a sorry figure. In 
retrospect, it would appear that all Newfoundland did of enduring signifi-
cance in the fisheries arbitration was to leave matters in the hands of others 
— and to agree, with Canada's concurrence, that a seventy-year old Scot, Sir 
Robert B. Finlay, be retained as their leading counsel. 
The imperial influence was subtly but strongly exerted. When Finlay was 
chosen, he brought his "devil" into the picture, Sir H. Erie Richards, who 
soon assumed the general direction of research that should normally have 
been Aylesworth's responsibility.62 When Finlay, former Attorney General 
58 George Young to Bryce, 28 July [l910], Bryce Papers, USA No. 32, Bodleian Library, 
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of Britain's old Tory government was engaged, the incumbent Liberal govern-
ment appointed its own Attorney General, Sir William S. Robson. As the 
British Prime Minister confidentially explained to the Colonial Secretary: 
Finlay would be briefed by the colonies; Robson by HMG.63 And finally there 
was the ubiquitous George Young, First Secretary in Bryce's embassy and 
as clever and designing a man who ever worked the backstages of diplomacy. 
Young was attached to the British contingent to The Hague as a "secretary." 
Though Aylesworth thought he had asked for Young, that the Foreign Office 
prevailed upon the Colonial Office to secure the latter's services confirms 
the suggestion that Agent Aylesworth could be knocked under whenever 
Britain started the "screw turning."64 
The preparation and management of the American case lay in the very 
capable hands of Chandler P. Anderson. Anderson was a real agent; his was 
the guiding hand in preparing the case, assigning tasks to counsel, getting 
data from specialists, pulling everything together. Under his general direction, 
the American participants became a well-drilled team. All the lawyers were 
engaged in the research and writing and everyone took part in the final oral 
arguments. In addition to three junior men, there was as many senior counsel: 
George Turner, an aggressive Spokane lawyer and former member of the 
Alaska Boundary Tribunal; Samuel J. Elder, one of Boston's best trial lawyers, 
picked for his sympathy towards Gloucester as well as his legal talents; and 
Elihu Root, another Alaska veteran, now Senator from New York and some-
time lawyer from the City, with the reputation of being one of its finest and 
most generously rewarded attorneys. Root had been drafted by President 
Taft in the fall of 1909 when the American group had grown concerned about 
the number and quality of their British opposition. Throughout the prepara-
tions, the "Gloucester committee" was regularly consulted; and when the 
Americans sailed off to The Hague, accompanying them as an "attaché" was 
Arthur L. Millett of the Gloucester Board of Trade and the Gloucester Daily 
Times. Of any undercover, pre-arbitral consultation between Anderson's 
group and Judge Gray, there remains no evidence; but it seems likely that the 
same sort of informal intimacy existed between them which later character-
ized Fitzpatrick's relations with George Young. 
After the Cases* Countercases and Written Arguments had been drawn up, 
distributed and presumably read, a distinguished assembly of jurists, scholars, 
diplomats and lawyers gathered at The Hague in May, 1910. Their work 
would take all summer. Arguments by counsel inched their way through ten 
long weeks, with morning and afternoon sessions four days a week. The 
pleading was followed by almost a month of deliberation (and secret diplo-
63 Asquith to Crewe, 22 April 1909, Crewe Papers, C40, Cambridge University Library. 
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macy) before the Tribunal announced its award on 7 September. Despite the 
fact that history was being made at The Hague, newspaper coverage of the 
proceedings was very light and the suspicion easily comes to mind that re-
porters were either uncomprehending or bored into silence. The Toronto 
Globe had virtually nothing to offer its readers. Back home in Canada, 
Laurier complained to Aylesworth about getting "very scanty news"; all he 
knew was that the speeches seemed interminable.65 (He said nothing about 
the fact that Aylesworth wrote him only twice between May and September.) 
In fact, the arguments were long, complex and very dull. One observer esti-
mated that approximately two and a half million words were spoken and over 
eleven hundred exhibits presented.66 About the eighth week, a British lawyer 
inadvertently referred to the Convention as the "treaty of 1918." Just at that 
time, a rare moment of silence coincided; and a second Briton whispered in 
an audible voice: "Good Lord! Have we been here that long?"67 
Many participants at The Hague reacted strongly to the pressures placed 
upon them by their work and the environment. Social relations between the 
Americans and the Newfoundlanders and Canadians, never too cordial, grew 
progressively colder as the proceedings lengthened. But among themselves, 
the Americans remained singularly unified. Anderson's leadership was 
always evident, never challenged. While some members of his team occasion-
ally worried about the results, he was never in doubt, positive that everything 
had been so well programmed that "the ultimate outcome, whatever the 
decision . . . , will be entirely satisfactory to the [ American] fishermen and 
to the Government."68 In sharp contrast, the British group never achieved a 
strong sense of unity. Unlike the Americans, they were composed of sub-
groups, each working for its own ends. They lacked common goals, and 
quarrelling quickly appeared, particularly among the Canadians. Aylesworth 
and Fitzpatrick were soon at odds. So intense was the Agent's hostility that 
he tried to deprive the Chief Justice of the rich fees ultimately given the 
arbitrators.69 Fitzpatrick had words with a Toronto lawyer whom Aylesworth 
had hired; and Ewart, as we have already noted, rarely spoke to anyone. 
What the British group needed was leadership, a role which Aylesworth 
simply could not fill. Doubtless his deafness was again a factor, but one 
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wonders whether character and intelligence were not more at fault. It was 
impossible for a impassioned imperialist like him to lead lawyers like Finlay 
and Robson, Attorneys General of the realm for whom he felt such awe. And, 
as Young so perceptively put it, "Canadians in London seem smaller than at 
Ottawa."70 At The Hague, Aylesworth was a small man who reportedly "did 
not even attend the daily conference at the close of each day's session when 
the happenings of the day were discussed and the plan for the next day 
arranged."71 Furthermore, he had not mastered the subject; judging by his 
actions and his utterances, he never understood that the Special Agreement 
had been designed to attain certain results. He was confused about central 
issues and the people who argued them. He would later give exclusive credit 
to Finlay and Robson for winning the case; he always believed that Question 
V (regarding the definition of the bays) was of primary importance. 
The question was really of minimal importance. The only bay that mattered 
to the Americans was Fundy, which had been excluded from arbitration; they 
had not used the others for years. The primary question was the initial one 
concerning fishery regulations and upon this the Americans concentrated 
their efforts. Two principal arguments were constructed and the responsi-
bility for their presentation given to Turner and Root. The first argument 
sought to apply the arcane doctrine of international servitudes to the fisheries, 
i.e., when the Convention of 1818 established a common fishery, ipso facto, 
Britain lost its sovereign right of regulation. The second contended that the 
Convention had imposed upon Britain "a contractual obligation limiting 
the exercise of British sovereignty in treaty waters, to the extent that the 
prerequisite of reasonableness must be determined before regulations could 
be enforced against American fishermen, and that neither Great Britain nor 
her colonies could be the sole judge of the question of reasonableness."72 
Both were contrived arguments, especially servitudes. Turner assumed the 
burden of this argument and led off for his side. It proved to be a theory more 
attractive to scholars than to jurists. "Servitudes" was effectively countered 
by British counsel and strongly contested by the judges, including both Gray 
and Fitzpatrick. In Young's opinion, when Turner closed, he left the Ameri-
cans "weaker than when he joined them."73 
When Root took the floor in the closing days of the trial, he presented the 
"contractual obligation," summed up his country's case and pitched into New-
foundland's fishing regulations. At first, Young thought him very ineffective, 
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but both Anderson and Elder were thrilled by his performance. Listening so 
intently he could not take notes, the Boston lawyer later remarked that "It 
seemed like getting out of an open boat in mid-ocean and being assured of 
getting to port."74 The American Agent thought Root's arguments were 
brilliant and wrote Washington that even the British counsel "were lost in 
admiration of . . . [ Root's] ability and admit it freely."75 When Root graphic-
ally illustrated the injustices of Newfoundland's regulations, he made a power-
ful impression upon all the judges. Even Fitzpatrick had to agree that some of 
Root's propositions "seemed reasonable."76 When Aylesworth grasped the 
full weight of Root's final plea, he was pleased that it had been reserved until 
the final moments of the trial. Otherwise, as he told Laurier, it would have 
been "very damaging." "As it was I dont [sic] believe it influenced any 
body."77 Aylesworth was so very wrong. To Fitzpatrick's dismay, he soon dis-
covered that "when the arbitrators were considering their award . . . . the neu-
trals having given us the main objects of right were going heavily against us 
as to this legislation." The only way he could see to avoid disaster was "to 
get the matter away from the Tribunal and [he] asked . . . [Young] to 
find a way."78 
In addition to the force of Root's words, there were, of course, other 
strong reasons inclining the Tribunal towards the logic of the American argu-
ment. It must be recalled that the terms of the Special Agreement predeter-
mined many of the results. That these terms were fully understood by counsel 
on both sides was brought out during the trial. Finlay had admitted, without 
objection from the Americans, that "The Award . . . will be a very worthy 
one for it will not only solve the differences which have already occurred, 
but will provide the principles and a method of procedure for disposing of 
any question which may arise in the future with regard to the application of 
those principles to any particular enactment."79 Also in open court and in 
response to a direct question from the bench, Root had stated that "all he 
wants is a suspensory veto — which of course [ Young sagely commented] 
he already has under Art. IV."80 
74 Margaret Munro Elder, The Life of Samuel J. Elder (New Haven, 1925), p. 302. 
75 Anderson to Hoyt, 8 August 1910, Anderson Papers, MD/LC. For Root's extended and 
forceful arguments, see "North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitration," Senate Document 
No. 870, 61st Cong., 3rd Ses. (Washington, 1912-13), XI, pp. 1927-2299. 
76 Aylesworth to Laurier, 31 August 1910, vol. 641, Laurier Papers, PAC. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Young to Bryce, 30 November 1910, USA No. 30, Bryce Papers, BL. 
79 Lammasch to Anderson, 20 August 1910, Anderson Papers, MD/LC. 
80 Young to Bryce, undated but probably 9 August 1910, USA No. 30, Bryce Papers, BL. 
Acadiensis 65 
Thus the Award makes sense. In its judgement, the Tribunal was guided 
by the terms of the Special Agreement as well as by the pleas of counsel, 
agreeing with British legal arguments but accepting the American statement 
of grievances. To avert a hostile opinion regarding regulations, Fitzpatrick 
persuaded Young secretly to fashion an award that would satisfy both parties, 
giving the British all they were entitled to receive on legal grounds and em-
ploying recommendations to soften the blow for the Americans and also to 
prevent future friction. Fitzpatrick had always thought in terms of com-
promise and advised Young of his wishes at an early date. On his part, Young 
had always toyed with potential diplomatic forms in which to convey the in-
evitable compromises. The two men complemented each other perfectly; 
they were innate and talented schemers. Young got his chance when Fitz-
patrick asked him to play a major, though clandestine, role in the drafting 
of the Award. According to Young — and there is no reason to doubt him — 
he drafted the critical decision for Question I; and, as he later remarked to 
Bryce, there was "little trouble" getting it accepted, "as the Americans were 
resigned to conceding the point of right if our proposals for a modus as to its 
exercise were fair."81 Question II, though drawn by Lohman (the Hollander), 
was also drafted in its final form by Young. Gray did HI and IV; Lohman, VI. 
Young was wholly responsible for V and VII. 
The Award itself was published on 7 September.82 It was a massive docu-
ment, difficult to understand; and one doubts whether many newspaper 
editors read or comprehended it. Every question was cited, every argument 
examined and answered, and the decisions rendered seriatim. 
The Tribunal accepted none of the arguments advanced by the United 
States to prove its case for Question I, casting them all aside before giving 
this verdict: 
The right of Great Britain to make regulations without the consent of 
the United States as to the exercise of the liberty to take fish . . . is in-
herent to the sovereignty of Great Britain. 
The exercise of that right . . . is, however, limited by the said treaty 
[ of 1818] in respect of the said liberties therein granted to the inhabitants 
of the United States in that such regulations must be bona fide and must 
not be in violation of said treaty. 
The Tribune then defined "reasonableness": 
Regulations which are (1) appropriate or necessary for the protection 
and preservation of such fisheries, or (2) desirable or necessary on 
81 Ibid., 2 September [l910] and 30 November 1910. 
82 Treaties and Agreements affecting Canada in Force between His Majesty and the United 
States of America . . . 1814-1925 (Ottawa, 1927), pp. 325-48. 
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grounds of public order and morals without unnecessarily interfering 
with the fishery itself, and in both cases equitable and fair as between 
local and American fishermen, and not so framed as to give unfairly 
an advantage to the former over the latter class, are not inconsistent 
with the obligation to execute the treaty in good faith, and are therefore 
reasonable and not in violation of the treaty. 
So much for principles, what about practice? The Tribunal had this to say: 
By reason . . . of the form in which Question I is put, and by further 
reason of the admission of Great Britain by her counsel before this 
Tribunal that it is not now for either of the Parties to the treaty I of 1818) 
to determine the reasonableness of any regulations made by Great 
Britain, Canada or Newfoundland, the reasonableness of any such regu-
lation, if contested, must be decided not by either of the Parties, but by 
an impartial authority in accordance with the principles hereinabove laid 
down, and in the manner proposed in the recommendations made by the 
Tribunal in virtue of Article IV of the agreement. 
The Tribunal further decided that Article IV of the agreement is, as 
stated by counsel of the respective parties at the argument, permanent 
in its e f fec t . . . . 
The Tribunal then went on to make specific pronouncements about 
Articles II, III and IV of the Special Agreement. Article II dealt with existing 
regulations; and since the judges were convinced by counsel that a decision 
on the reasonableness of existing regulations "requires expert information 
. . . as contemplated by Article III," no further action needed to be taken. 
In accordance with Article III, the Tribunal called "upon the Parties to 
designate within one month their national Commissioner for the expert 
examination of the questions submitted." (The Tribunal then named its com-
missioner.) If, at the request of either party, President Lammasch reconvened 
the Tribunal, it was to consider the expert committee's report. If that report 
were unanimous, it would become part of the Award. If not, the Tribunal 
would itself rule over the disputed regulations; but the Tribunal recommended 
that the parties accept either a unanimous report or the opinion of the non-
national member. As for Article IV, the Tribunal "recommended" that all 
future fishing regulations be published in appropriate Gazettes two months 
before their operation; that the United States give notice of any objection; 
that any regulation designated as objectionable was not to go into effect until 
the "Permanent Mixed Fishery Commissions for Canada and Newfoundland" 
decided upon its reasonableness; that the PMFCs be established according 
to prescribed form; that if the national members of the PMFCs could not 
agree, the non-nationals should decide; and that, in all cases, a unanimous 
or a majority decision of the PMFCs would be "final and binding." 
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Moving to the other six questions brought before it, the Tribunal made 
the following judgements: II. American inhabitants could employ non-
inhabitants, but any non-inhabitants employed as part of any fishing crew 
"derived no benefit or immunity from the treaty." III. American ships 
"should" report to customs, "if proper conveniences and an opportunity for 
doing so are provided." (This could be done by telegraph.) IV. American 
ships entering the "non-Treaty" coast for the four specified purposes and 
remaining over forty-eight hours "should" report to customs either in person 
or by telegraph, "if reasonably convenient opportunity therefore is afforded." 
V. Regarding the definition of bays, the three-marine-mile was to be measured 
from a straight line across the bay "where it ceases to have the configuration 
and characteristics of a bay." To make that decision "more practicable," 
the Tribunal recommended that, in every bay unprovided for, the line should 
be drawn across the bay at the first point where the bay did not exceed ten 
miles in width; and that in particular bays (and they were named), the lines 
should be drawn as the Tribunal specified. VI. American inhabitants could 
fish in the bays, creeks and harbors of the treaty coasts of Newfoundland 
and the Magdalen Islands. ("Sic transit gloria Bondi.") VII. American ships 
seeking to exercise treaty rights could also claim commercial privileges, but 
they could not "at the same time and during the same voyage exercise their 
treaty rights and enjoy their commercial privileges 
Thus the differences between the cables sent home by the two Agents 
are explicable. When Aylesworth exultantly informed Laurier of the British 
victory, he was referring to the fact that most of the American arguments 
seemed to have been defeated. When Anderson cabled home, he had in 
mind the recommendations as well as the principles of the Award; and in this 
assumption, history has proved him right. Yet, given the backstage diplomacy 
underlying the Award, he wisely got confirmation as to its meaning. From 
Fitzpatrick, he obtained assurances that "he did not anticipate any difficulty 
in securing . . . [the adoption] of the recommendations by Great Britain."83 
"Fitz" also claimed that Aylesworth was "favorably disposed" and that Robson 
"had promised to support. . . [ the recommendations]." Moreover, the Cana-
dian jurist also recalled that "all the legislation specifically objected to by you 
[Anderson] is referred to the Expert Commission for their opinion"; and of 
this view, Lammasch, Gray and Lohman wrote Anderson of their concur-
rence.84 It is, therefore, understandable that Anderson should conclude that 
American fishermen would "no longer be a prey to the prejudice and hostility 
83 Anderson to Root, 10 September 1910, Anderson Papers, MD/LC. 
84 Fitzpatrick to Anderson, 9 September 1910, ibid. See also Lammasch, Grey and Lohman to 
Anderson, all dated 8 September 1910, ibid. 
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of the local authorities . . . ."85 Or, as Robson confided to Elder: "We have 
saved our sovereignty but we can't exercise it."86 
All that remained to be done was to wrap up the recommendations in a 
suitable treaty. It was a final touch that took almost two years to complete, 
requiring Aylesworth's retirement from politics, Laurier's defeat in the 
election of 1911 and the coming to power of Robert Borden. The chief 
trouble was Aylesworth himself. His misinterpretation of the Award led to 
confusion in Ottawa and the resultant complication of Canadian-American 
diplomacy. When news of The Hague's decision reached Canada, the press 
proclaimed it as a triumph: Aylesworth was a conquering hero largely re-
sponsible for upholding Canadian sovereignty and defeating the preposterous 
American claims.87 It was an unmerited honor which the minister helped 
perpetuate. In the House of Commons, he informed fellow Canadians that 
they now had "the sole right to legislate with regard to . . . [the fisheries] 
exactly and in the same extent as we have to legislate to the people and the 
. . . city of Ottawa."88 Fishing regulations need only be reasonable and bona 
fide. Unhappily, however, he did have to admit that any existing regulations 
to which the United States objected might have to be referred to the Tribu-
nal's committee of experts, but he hoped diplomacy could reach a settlement 
short-circuiting that arrangement. As for the Tribunal's creation of Per-
manent Mixed Fisheries Commissions to secure future disputes, he scorned 
the whole process as "but a recommendation." Evidently he and Fitzpatrick 
had not discussed at The Hague the critical association between the Award 
85 Anderson's draft Report or Arbitration and its Results, undated but written in the fall of 
1910, Anderson Papers, MD/LC. 
86 Elder, Life, pp. 305 and 306. Contemporary British and American authorities, men with a 
personal knowledge of events, agreed with Robson: Edwin M. Borchardt. "The North Atlan-
tic Fisheries Arbitration," Columbia Law Review, XI (January, 1911), pp. 1-23; Samuel J. 
Elder, "The Fisheries Arbitration at The Hague," New England Magazine, XLIII (November-
December, 1910), pp. 265-76; an unsigned editorial written by George Young, "The North 
Atlantic Fisheries Arbitration," The Economist, 10 September 1910; Robert Lansing, 'The 
North Atlantic Fisheries Arbitration," American Journal of International Law, V, pp. 1-31; 
and H. Erie Richards, "The North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitration," Journal of the 
Society of Comparative Legislation, XXIII (November, 1910), pp. 18-27. Borchardt was an 
American expert on international law from the Library of Congress who accompanied the 
American delegation to The Hague. Lansing was a junior counsel attached to the American 
group. Richards, of course, was Finlay's "devil." 
87 See, for example, Halifax Herald and Morning Chronicle, 8 September 1910; Saint John 
Globe and Standard, 8 September 1910; Toronto Mail and Empire, 9 September 1910; 
London Free Press, 8 September 1910; Toronto Globe, 8 September 1910; and Toronto 
News, 7 and 8 September 1910. 
88 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 11th Parliament, 3rd Session, 2 December 1910, 
pp. 664-94. 
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and the recommendations; or, if they had, Aylesworth had forgotten or failed 
to understand. 
Sir Wilfrid stood behind his Agent rather than his Arbitrator. When Bryce 
informed him that Fitzpatrick's assurances at The Hague had bound Canada 
to the recommendations as part of the Award, the Prime Minister countered 
by saying he had never heard of any such deal and that, even if it had oc-
curred, it was not binding. Fitzpatrick had no authority to act for Canada; 
only Aylesworth, as Agent, had that power. Furthermore, claimed Laurier, 
"Fitz" had never said anything to him about assurances89 — and the Chief 
Justice never would. Though reconfirming the fact to a worried Chandler 
P. Anderson,90 Fitzpatrick ended up by denying everything in Canada. He 
went to the Governor-General and unabashedly stated that he never "went 
beyond his duties as one of the Arbitrators, or . . . gave any assurance to the 
United States Representatives that the recommendations would be 
accepted."91 
With or without Fitzpatrick's assurances, it seems doubtful that Laurier 
would have approved Anderson's efforts to implement the recommendations. 
While amenable to an agreement which shelved the committee of experts 
and worked out a compromise on the current Canadian regulations particu-
larly vexatious to Americans, Sir Wilfrid rejected out of hand a draft treaty 
designed to convert the PMFCs into truly permanent form. Even if Laurier 
could have carried Aylesworth with him, he dared not confront his opposition 
in the House with a plan too easily misconstrued as an abridgement of Cana-
dian sovereignty. Fighting already for his political life over the issue of 
Reciprocity, Laurier would have been foolish to accept the draft; and neither 
Bryce nor London could change his mind. Not even the threat of the United 
States to withhold its signature from a new General Arbitration Treaty had 
any effect upon him. The most Laurier would concede was a vague promise 
to the Governor-General that, after the forthcoming general election, he 
would visit Washington and discuss the matter with President Taft.92 Of 
course, that was one promise Laurier did not have to keep. 
Ironically, Borden's new government, which was helped into power with 
a good deal of anti-American campaigning, easily came to terms with the 
United States. Borden had the good sense to mend fences quickly; and, 
unlike Aylesworth, he understood that the Special Agreement of 1909 had 
empowered the Hague Tribunal to recommend rules and procedure for 
89 Laurier to Lord Grey, 8 August 1911, enclosed in Grey to Bryce, 10 August, USA No. 32, 
Bryce Papers, BL. 
90 Fitzpatrick to Anderson, 30 May 1911, Anderson Papers, MD/LC. 
91 Lord Grey to Harcourt, 28 August 1911, vol. 17, Grey of Howick Papers, PAC. 
92 Memorandum (dated 26 July 1911) of conversation between Lord Grey and Laurier held 
on the night of the 25th, vol. 5., ibid. 
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settling future differences.93 Furthermore, Aylesworth, that unbending and 
uncomprehending foe of recommendations, no longer sat in the House of 
Commons. Although he had left a time-bomb behind in his office — a memo-
randum attacking the envisaged procedure of the PMFCs — it was readily 
disarmed by diplomacy. A compromise version of Anderson's draft treaty 
was worked out which satisfied almost everyone in Ottawa, including 
Laurier.94 According to its terms, at the end of each fishing season, Canada 
would give advance notice to the United States of any new regulations pro-
posed for the following season. If the United States had any objections, it had 
to specify them within forty-five days, and the PMFC would then decide 
whether the regulation(s) was (were) reasonable and/or applicable to Ameri-
can fishermen; if the United States took no action, new regulations were 
presumed to be reasonable. By this simple device was it possible for Canada 
to preserve her sovereignty while permitting the United States to question 
reasonableness of regulations. 
On 12 July 1912, the final treaty was signed — and that was that: the ulti-
mate resolution of the fisheries question.95 Though cheers might have been 
expected, neither headlines nor editorials greeted the event in Halifax news-
papers. Chandler P. Anderson celebrated the occasion by writing his old 
comrade, George Turner: "I am sure you'll agree with me that it secures a 
very substantial advantage for the U.S."96 What Aylesworth thought, no one 
knows. More to the point was the balanced judgement rendered by President 
Taft in his Annual Message on 3 December 1912: 
In the negotiations . . . between the two Governments, undertaken for 
the purpose of giving practical effect to . . . rules and methods . . . 
[recommended at The Hague] it was found that certain modifications 
therein were desirable from the point of view of both Governments, and 
these negotiations have finally resulted in the agreement . . . by which 
the award recommendations as modified by the mutual consent of the 
two Governments are finally adopted and made effective, thus bringing 
the century-old controversy to a final conclusion, which is equally bene-
ficial and satisfactory to both Governments.97 
It was a sensible statement and, not surprisingly, written for the President 
by Chandler P. Anderson. From start to finish, the settlement of the fisheries 
was programmed diplomacy. 
93 See Borden to Alfred Mitchell Innes (Councillor at the British Embassy), 10 February 1912, 
Borden Papers, OC 138, PAC. Mitchell Innes had advised Borden (without Bryce's knowl-
edge?) that The Hague had exceeded its powers when it recommended rules and methods 
for determining future differences regarding the fisheries. Borden flatly disagreed with him. 
94 Bryce to Sir Edward Grey, 15 December 1911, Grey Papers, FO 800/83, PRO. 
95 Treaties and Agreements affecting Canada, pp. 456-9. 
96 3 August 1912, Anderson Papers, MD/LC. 
97 Foreign Relations, 1912 (Washington, 1919), 1912, xviii. 
